humanities 589 university of toronto quarterly, volume 74, number 1, winter 2004/5 with Hagar or at the moment of self-completing possibility as with Morag. The common trajectory, however, is consistent in all Laurence's works.
Tila L. Kellman's analysis of Michael Snow focuses on an active and subjective engagement with a selected group of Snow's artwork. Kellman posits the viewer as a witness, rather than as a voyeur, and understands Snow's practice as one of framing and mediation, one that 'works toward democratizing the world of art and opening different avenues by which to recognize and refigure my self.' Following Annette Michelson, who draws a parallel between Snow's and Marcel Duchamp's framing practices, the works Kellman selects for her analysis the Walking Woman series, Sight, Portrait, Venetian Blind, Authorization, IRIS-iris, Scope, Press, Membrane, and La Région Centrale are posited as frame-works. Snow's frames question the nature of mediums, their cross-over, and the problem of seeing and the mastery of seeing. In so far as the works deal with the banalities of everyday life, they have political and ethical significance, and produce reflexive spaces in which the viewer is able to ask 'who?' Taking up Heidegger's idea that art has the power to redeem the self from the damage caused by technology, Kellman argues that Snow's practice of framing has a redemptive potential. Framing thus works as a xxxxxxxx tool for 'imaginatively detaching and mobilizing whatever falls within its bounds.' Through irony and puns, according to Kellman, Snow's framing enables the viewer (me) to explore sights and possibilities conditioned by personal memories and subjective responses, allowing me to recognize myself as metaphorically damaged and then go beyond given structures of desire, domination, and narration.
For Kellman, unlike earlier critics of Snow, we do not become aware of our own consciousness in the experience of his works, but rather of our own perception. Following Derrida, she argues that the notion of consciousness comprehends a teleological process that posits a subject (you and me) that is insufficient and vulnerable, always striving towards full recognition. Such a reading is linked to a search for higher knowledge, which remains unverifiable and bound to power relationships. Instead of a fixed notion of consciousness, truth, and knowledge, Kelman adopts the Derridean view that knowledge is subjective and expressed in language. As such, the subject is free to add his or her own interpretation, attitude, or intention. The focus is on how the subject reads and interprets these works, rather than how he or she becomes conscious of the material.
Kellman explains the subject that some of Snow's work demands through Ricoeur's definition of the subject as existence: 'I want, I move, I do,' which requires and includes my body. It becomes a question of selfdesignation, of desire, and action. Self-designation takes place in discourse, which is the event of the encounter with the works. Kellman, taking after Ricoeur and Derrida, frees interpretation from authorial intention, thereby destabilizing the reader's understanding by a moment of reflection, which for Ricoeur is a detour through self-understanding: 'to understand is to understand oneself in front of the text.' Therefore, Kellman's analysis consists of a series of subjective reflections and understanding processes that take place in the event of her encounter with Snow's works.
This hermeneutical position, the detour for reflection, 'assumes competing moments of self-dispossession and refiguration,' as in the process of understanding we lose ourselves only to reconstitute ourselves later. This is how Snow's frames 'steal' or borrow my sight and then return it to me, allowing me to gain a new understanding of my self and redeeming it from structures of domination and frustrating models that 'formulate you and me as the end points of messages (gendered viewer), or as consumers, or as units of technology.' Furthermore, a subjective interpretation 'transfers love and the problem of self-understanding into the public domain.' Instead of validation, redemption gives love the task to reconstitute the self, turning it into an ethical question in terms of the relationship with the Other.
For her interpretation, Kellman borrows Benjamin's notion of redemption, Eliade's language of loans and payments, Derrida's principle of the Postcard, and Ricoeur's idea of self-understanding as love, among other concepts. The result is a theoretical impasse reflecting the current trend in cultural studies that aspires to redeem art from the danger of being an instrument for power and domination. Arguably, Kelman's shift from epistemological inquiry to perceptual subjectivism does not redeem vision from referentiality and epistemological models, as vision (which is what Snow's work is all about) takes place in our mind and not in our senses. Kelman borrows the reader's intellect to put him or her through her own reflective processes of redemptive analysis. Adapted from an address given at Hanover College, 'Narrative Hunger and the Overflowing Cupboard' provides a synthesis of Shields's best thoughts on writing and reading, on the need for narrative, and the limitations imposed upon the world's multitudinous 'story hoard' by language, literary theory, and genre. At once dense and lucid, 'Narrative Hunger' reveals not only the breadth of Shields's reading (the piece alludes at various points to Nabokov, Frye, Woolf, George Steiner, Annie Dillard, Barthes, and Eco) but also her abiding concern with what the novel has been, is, and might yet still become. A rigorous critique of the shortcomings of 'realist' and 'postmodernist' discourses, and a passionate defence of the necessity of fiction, it is required reading for anyone who cares about Shields's work and the ideas that shaped it. The following nine essays take the ideas developed in Shields's piece as a template for their own discussions and are particularly illuminating in their analyses of Shields's equivocal relationship with postmodernism. The first section examines Shields's experiments with narrative form and genre; the second deals with her attempts to take 'a step beyond' the postmodern language game. Sarah Gamble cogently traces the 'patterns of repetition, doubling and exchange' in Shields's early texts and identifies their tension between linguistic and non-linguistic forms of creative expression. (Gamble's analysis does, however, omit reference to the poet narrator of The Box Garden and to that novel's engagement with Small Ceremonies.) Faye Hammill persuasively argues for The Republic of Love as a self-conscious revision and rehabilitation of the romantic novel, highlighting the elements
